Narrow Replication of Fisman and Miguel's (2007a) ‘Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets’ (replication data)

DOI

This note provides a narrow replication of Fisman and Miguel's (Journal of Political Economy, 2007a; 115(6): 1020-1048) original findings about estimating negative binomial count models to study corruption practices among United Nations diplomats. We present estimates based on zero-inflated count models, given the possible presence of excessive zero counts in the dependent variable of the main specifications. Our results confirm Fisman and Miguel's original findings. However, they also suggest the importance of considering distinct generating processes for zero outcomes. We cannot reject hypotheses favoring the use of zero-inflated negative binomial models over its simpler versions in this context.

Identifier
DOI https://doi.org/10.15456/jae.2022326.0703365595
Metadata Access https://www.da-ra.de/oaip/oai?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_dc&identifier=oai:oai.da-ra.de:775458
Provenance
Creator Albergaria, Matheus; Fávero, Luiz Paulo Lopes
Publisher ZBW - Leibniz Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Publication Year 2017
Rights Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC-BY); Download
OpenAccess true
Contact ZBW - Leibniz Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Representation
Language English
Resource Type Collection
Discipline Jurisprudence; Law; Social and Behavioural Sciences