Replication files: Binding Contracts, Non-Binding Promises and Social Feedback in the Intertemporal Common-Pool Resource Game

DOI

In the intertemporal common-pool resource game, non-cooperative behavior produces externalities reducing subjects’ payoffs in both the present and the future. In this paper, we investigate through two experiments whether binding contracts, non-binding promises and social feedback help to promote sustainable behavior. We find that cooperation is higher in groups where a contract can be signed or where subjects made a promise to cooperate throughout the experiment. However, not all groups sign the contract unanimously and subjects who made a promise adjust their cooperation downwards over time. We find no difference between the control condition without any regulation and the treatment condition in which subjects receive feedback on their past behavior in private. However, if received feedback can be learned by all group members, cooperation is significantly higher. Our findings show that non-binding promises and social feedback increase cooperation, but the former only in the short-run and the latter only if made public.

Nicht-Wahrscheinlichkeitsauswahl - Willkürliche Auswahl

Laboratory experimentExperiment.Laboratory

LaborexperimentExperiment.Laboratory

Identifier
DOI https://doi.org/10.7802/2558
Source https://search.gesis.org/research_data/SDN-10.7802-2558?lang=de
Metadata Access https://datacatalogue.cessda.eu/oai-pmh/v0/oai?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_ddi25&identifier=64f0615294969db24d42492d50da16cc4ac4c4e08d23c04e61e6e9bb34c1502b
Provenance
Creator Przepiorka, Wojtek; Diekmann, Andreas
Publisher GESIS Data Archive for the Social Sciences; GESIS Datenarchiv für Sozialwissenschaften
Publication Year 2023
Rights Free access (without registration) - The research data can be downloaded directly by anyone without further limitations. CC BY-NC-ND 4.0: Namensnennung - Nicht kommerziell – Keine Bearbeitung (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de); Freier Zugang (ohne Registrierung) - Die Forschungsdaten können von jedem direkt heruntergeladen werden. CC BY-NC-ND 4.0: Namensnennung - Nicht kommerziell – Keine Bearbeitung (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de)
OpenAccess true
Contact http://www.gesis.org/
Representation
Discipline Social Sciences
Spatial Coverage Schweiz; Schweiz