Competition in large markets (replication data)

DOI

This paper evaluates the simplifying assumption that producers compete in a large market without substantial strategic interactions using nonparametric regressions of producers' choices on market size. With such atomistic competition, increasing the number of consumers leaves the distributions of producers' prices and other choices unchanged. In many models featuring non-trivial strategic considerations, producers' prices fall as their numbers increase. I examine observations of restaurants' sales, seating capacities, exit decisions, and prices from 222 US cities. Given factor prices and demographic variables, increasing a city's size increases restaurants' average sales and decreases their exit rate and prices. These results suggest that strategic considerations lie at the heart of restaurant pricing and turnover.

Identifier
DOI https://doi.org/10.15456/jae.2022320.0723952830
Metadata Access https://www.da-ra.de/oaip/oai?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_dc&identifier=oai:oai.da-ra.de:775803
Provenance
Creator Campbell, Jeffrey R.
Publisher ZBW - Leibniz Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Publication Year 2011
Rights Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC-BY); Download
OpenAccess true
Contact ZBW - Leibniz Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Representation
Language English
Resource Type Collection
Discipline Economics