Does Response Selection Determine the Presence of a Task-Switch Cost After Selective Nogo Trials, 2018-2022

DOI

The original grant that funded the collection encompasses a variety of studies. The main aim of the project was to investigate whether what we "know" and what we "do" have different effects on our subsequent behaviour investigated by looking at our ability to switch between different tasks. The data set includes trial data from seven experiments that used a cued task-switching procedure combined with a selective go/nogo procedure.Below is the original grant abstract, which encompasses a variety of studies. Please refer to Data description (abstract) for details on the two studies uploaded in this collection. In this project we will investigate whether what we "know" and what we "do" have different effects on our subsequent behaviour. We will do this by looking at our ability to switch between different tasks. Specifically, we will compare how difficult it is to switch away from a task that we have either: a) only prepared to perform (we "knew" what the relevant task was but we didn't "do" it), or ii) actually performed (we both "knew" it and "did" it). In our everyday lives we frequently need to switch between the different rules that guide our behaviour. For instance, when driving a car we might switch rapidly between the following "tasks": visually assessing potential hazards at a junction; accelerating past a tractor; performing an emergency stop. From studies using laboratory tasks, we know that switching tasks usually leads to slowed responses, and that we occasionally even repeat the previous task in error. The existence of this "switch cost" reveals that some aspect of the previous task must persist in some way to affect the speed or accuracy of our subsequent behaviour, even though we know that it is no longer relevant. In this project, we wish to find out about what causes this cost of switching between tasks. Our main question concerns whether just preparing a task ("knowing") will have different consequences from actually performing it ("doing"). There are various examples in psychology of situations where what we know has surprisingly little impact upon what we do. For instance, we can sometimes verbally repeat instructions given to us, and demonstrate that we understand and remember them, but then fail to implement them at all (a phenomenon known as "goal neglect"). A similar distinction has been drawn in task-switching research. It had been thought that doing a task would produce a subsequent switch cost, but that knowing which task should be performed without actually carrying it out would produce no subsequent cost. However, more recent evidence using a different method suggests that merely preparing a task can in fact produce a substantial switch cost, even if the prepared task was not performed. We will conduct a series of psychological experiments in which people perform two different tasks. For instance, we will show them coloured shapes (like a blue circle) and ask them to press a button to indicate either what the colour is or what the shape is. By intermixing the two tasks randomly, we will be able to assess people's ability to switch between tasks, relative to repeating tasks - that is, we can measure each person's switch cost. On most trials, people will prepare a task and then perform it: for instance, they may see the word "colour" and then a blue circle, at which point they press the appropriate button to indicate that the colour is blue. Crucially, however, on some trials we will require a task to be prepared but not performed: e.g., we may show the word "colour" but then no coloured shape, instead moving straight on to the next trial. Therefore, we will be able to measure the switch cost that follows preparation separately from the switch cost that follows performance. Across a series of experiments we aim to find out what causes these types of switch cost to be established and abolished, and in what ways the switch cost driven by preparation may differ from that driven by performance. The cost of switching tasks indicates a fundamental limitation in our cognitive system that is relevant to many situations (e.g., working in a busy office, driving in heavy traffic, preparing dinner while taking care of a baby). Understanding the mechanisms behind this limitation is of potential practical importance with respect to reducing risks associated with this cost. The present project will meet this challenge by illuminating the origin of this limitation.

Participants were recruited from Prolific, a commercial online subject pool. The experiment was developed in Inquisit, which only worked on a laptop or desk-top computers (but not on a mobile device).

Identifier
DOI https://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-856099
Metadata Access https://datacatalogue.cessda.eu/oai-pmh/v0/oai?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_ddi25&identifier=2a8b314aeb98d73cf9a7557f621a7756d41c55218635f097d801f6247e3a9029
Provenance
Creator Yamaguchi, M, University of Essex; Swainson, R, University of Aberdeen
Publisher UK Data Service
Publication Year 2023
Funding Reference ESRC
Rights Motonori Yamaguchi, University of Essex. Rachel Swainson, University of Aberdeen; The UK Data Archive has granted a dissemination embargo. The embargo will end on 1 March 2024 and the data will then be available in accordance with the access level selected.
OpenAccess true
Representation
Resource Type Numeric; Text
Discipline Psychology; Social and Behavioural Sciences
Spatial Coverage Prolific (commercial online subect pool); United Kingdom; United States