Socio-economic studies on fisheries crime in developing countries have focused on resource extractors (fishermen), and neglected fishmongers (typically women) who are passive participants in the illegal fishing activities. Although they do not face the same level of risk and severity of punishment as their male counterparts owing to socio-cultural norms that do not allow women to directly engage in fishing but indirectly support fishing through say provision of finance, social, economic, and psychological factors may determine their decision to support illegality by trading in the illegal catch, and the effect of participation on household welfare. By employing an endogenous treatment effect model, the study investigates the decision to participate in trading in fish caught illegally (i.e., saiko) in Ghana, and the impact of participation on food security and household expenditure. We found that peer pressure and the misperception of catch trends increased the likely of participation, and participants spend less but are more food secured. In addition, fishmongers who are sensitive to changes in incomes over a narrow range of income are less likely to participate, have lower household spending but are more food secure. Thus, providing adequate and timely information on the state of the fish stocks to fish traders and embarking to social protection programs aimed at improving their food security status may reduce the participation in the saiko trade.
Non-probability: PurposiveNon-probability: Purposive
Icke-sannolikhetsurval: syftesurvalIcke-sannolikhetsurval: syftesurval
Probability: Cluster: Stratified randomProbability: Cluster: Stratified random
Sannolikhetsurval: klusterurval: stratifierat slumpmässigtSannolikhetsurval: klusterurval: stratifierat slumpmässigt
ProbabilityProbability
SannolikhetsurvalSannolikhetsurval
Non-probabilityNon-probability
Icke-sannolikhetsurvalIcke-sannolikhetsurval
Face-to-face interview: CAPI/CAMIFace-to-face interview: CAPI/CAMI
Personlig intervju: CAPI/CAMIPersonlig intervju: CAPI/CAMI
